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TOWARD A DEFINITION OF STRIKING
SIMILARITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS
FOR COPYRIGHTED MUSICAL WORKS
Federal jurists in the United States have had great difficulty formulating the
appropriate standard by which to adjudicate an alleged infringement of a
copyrighted musicalwork.' A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement must show
ownership of a valid copyright and misappropriation of original elements of the
at-issue work.' Proof of a valid copyright is easily met;3 however, establishing that
a defendant copied the original elements of one's musical work can be onerous
and time-consuming. Courts have searched (often, in vain) for a straightforward
"test" that allows plaintiffs to introduce evidence appropriate to copyright causes
of action but also acknowledges the unique nature of music among the subject
matter covered by copyright law.5
Courts have defined two methods for proving substantive copying of an
original work. A plaintiff may elect to present evidence that the defendant had
"access" to the copyrighted work and that the two works are "substantially
similar."6 Alternatively, where access is incapable of proof, the plaintiff may
present evidence that the works at issue are "strikingly similar";' the "striking"
nature of the similarity allows the court to infer the defendant's access to the
' See, e g., Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (assessing the confused state of musical plagiarism jurisprudence).
2 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985).
3 Indeed, a certificate of copyright registration, before or within the first five years of
publication, constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership of a valid copyright. See 17 U.S.C. S
410(c); Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
' The following may be copyrighted: literary, musical, and dramatic works, pantomimes or
choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, motion pictures/other audiovisual
works, sound recordings, and architecture. 17 U.S.C. S 102.
- For an excellent discussion of the uniqueness of music among copyrightable subject matter,
oegeneraal Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idka-Fernsion in Mmii Ana andthe Rok of the Intexnd
Adience in Mwi Copynght Infiingement, 28 CAL. W. L REV. 395 (1992).
6 Anrtein, 154 F.2d at 468; McRae v. Smith, 968 F. Supp. 559,562,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1131
(D. Colo. 1997).
7 McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 565.
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copyrighted work.' The inquiry does not end there, for the plaintiff must also
prove that the similarities, if they exist at all, result from an i/Iegacopying of the
plaintiff's work."
Courts have inconsistently defined the parameters of "substantial similarity"
for copyright infringement purposes."0 Likewise, while some authorities posit
that, to be "striking," the possibility that similarities between the two works
resulted from independent creation, coincidence, or prior common source must
effectively be precluded,"1 most courts have not defined adequately the boundaries
of the "striking similarity" doctrine, nor the point at which "substantial" similarity
becomes "striking."1  This Note seeks to more clearly define the factual
circumstances under which similarities between two musical works properly can
be labeled "striking." The discussions herein will probe the distinctions between
substantial and striking similarities by comparing judicial treatments of "substan-
tially similar" and "strikingly similar" claims within the exclusive context of
copyrighted musical works.
I. LITIGATING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTCLAIMS FOR MUSICAL WORKS:
THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY ARNSTEIN V. PORTER!3
The Second Circuit's decision inArnstein v. Porterprovided the framework for
almost all infringement litigation of copyrighted musical works.4 InArnstein, the
s Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 195 (7th Cir. 1984).
Not all copying of an original work qualifies as illegal misappropriation; some falls within
statutory exceptions such as "fair use." Ser 17 U.S.C. S 107 (codifying the parameters of the "fair
use" doctrine).
10 Even the phrase "substantial similarity" has engendered a great deal of confusion among
jurists, predominately because of its dual application in the copying and misappropriation phases of
copyright analysis. See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Tel., Inc., 126 F.3d 70,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(2d Cir. 1997) ("[W]hen 'substantial similarity' is used to mean the threshold for copying as a factual
matter, the better term is 'probative similarity,' and... 'substantial similarity' should mean only the
threshold for actionable copying."). Id at 74.
" Se/k, 741 F.2d at 901-02.
12 Indeed, the author has found very few cases decided in favor of a plaintiff who argued that
his copyrighted work and the infringing work were "strikingly similar." See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863
F.2d 1061, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to permit a jury to infer access based on striking similarity); but see Tii, 97 F. Supp. 2d at
548 (holding that "plaintiff has made no showing of striking similarity"); McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 565
(holding "protectable elements not strikingly similar").
' 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
'4 Circuit Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts across the country have relied on Amtin
as persuasive. See, e.., McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 559; Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1720 (9th Cir. 2000).
[Vol. 37:113
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Second Circuit reviewed a lower court's refusal to grant the plaintiff a jury trial."
While ultimately remanding the case on the grounds that the plaintiff was entitled
to a jury trial, 6 the Second Circuit set forth the proof scheme a plaintiff is
required to meet in copyright actions, particularly where musical works are
concerned. 7
The court began by noting that a plaintiff must prove not only copying, but
also that the copying qualifies as 'improper appropriation."" Copying is
established either by direct evidence (the defendant's admission that he copied),
or, more frequently, circumstantial evidence "from which the trier of the facts
may reasonably infer copying."" Circumstantial evidence may be presented in
two forms: the plaintiff may prove that the defendant had "access"' 2 to the
plaintiff's work and that the works are "similar," or he may prove that the
similarities between the works are so striking that the court should infer the
defendant's access, even if actual evidence of access is weak.21
Many courts' have limited a striking similarity allegation in the following way:
"If evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to preclude
the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the same
result."' Therefore, the court differentiates between the necessary level of
similarity if the plaintiff's evidence of access is strong and the quantity of the
plaintiff's similarity showing where he can present little evidence of access.
However, the court gives no guidance as to what type or quantity of evidence is
required to distinguish those similarities that are merely substantial from those
which "strike" the court, allowing it to infer access.
Following its discussion of copying, the Am ein court posits a second
question that must be answered: Has the defendant "illicitly" copied the





' Access to a plaintiffs work can be demonstrated in a number of ways. One court has posited
the following two avenues as most common: 1) the plaintiff's work and the defendant's access to
that work are evidenced by a "particular chain of events" that lead from one to the other (by dealing
with a record company or publisher); or 2) the plaintiff's work has been widely disseminated. Three
B ys Muic Corp., 212 F.3d 477,482,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1720,1724 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Repp
v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 890,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1997) (examining both of
these scenarios in determining whether a defendant had access to a plaintiff's work).
2" Amstein, 154 F.2d at 469.
2 See Repp, 132 F.3d at 890, Dimmie v. Carey, 88 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
11 Anstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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plaintiff's work? 4 The court refers to this element as "misappropriation":25 first
noting that there can be "permissible copying,"' the court then states, "[t]he
question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom
such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff."' The court noted that, while analytic
dissection of the at-issue works by musical experts is proper when considering the
issue of copying,' misappropriation by contrast, must be determined by the "lay
listener," rendering expert testimony irrelevant." If the trier of fact determines
that the defendant has not only copied, but also misappropriated, certain elements
of the work; then, and only then, may the defendant properly be found liable for
copyright infringement."
II. SUBSTANTVEJUDICIAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE ARNSTEIN MODEL
SID &MARYKROFFT TELE VISIONPRODUCFION, INC V. MCDONALD'S
CORPORATONOI AND THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
Since the Arnstein decision in 1946, certain courts have elaborated upon and,
in some cases, modified the copyright propositions for which Arnstein stood. The
most notable of these cases is Sid & Marty Krofft Teleision Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp.2 While Krfft did not involve an alleged infringement of a copyrighted
musical work, its implications for all subjects covered under copyright law,
including musical works, are clear.
3
In Kr0ffl, the plaintiffs, owners of a copyrighted children's television show,
were awarded damages based on copyright infringement of that show by the
defendants.' The defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that, as a
matter of law, its copying of the plaintiffs' work did not constitute misappropria-
tion because the defendants' work and the plaintiffs' work were too "dissimilar." 5
24 Id
2 Id at 473.
- Id at 472.
Id at 473.
Armrtei, 154 F.2d at 468.
29 Id at 473.
30 Id at 468.
31 562 F.2d 1157,196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (9th Cir. 1977).
32 id
31 Indeed, the litigation framework established in Kr0f was held applicable to infringement
actions involving copyrighted musical works in Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1059 (9th Cir. 1987).
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The court eventually concluded that, under its "idea/expression" analysis, the
defendants had indeed infringed on the plaintiffs' copyright.3 6 It is this
"idea/expression" dichotomy that requires further discussion.
The court first noted that "two competing social interests" justify the existence
of copyright law. "rewarding an individual's creativity and effort while at the same
time permitting the nation to enjoy the benefits and progress from use of the
same subject matter."'37 From this policy base, the court determined that
copyright infringement occurs only where a defendant has copied the expression
of a plaintiff's idea, rather than simply the idea itself. 8
The court adopted a two-pronged test to determine the level of similarity
between two works 9 The first part, labeled the "extrinsic test," evaluates the
level of similarity between the ideas proposed by the two works.4' On this point,
analytic testimony, including the opinions of expert witnesses in the field, is not
only helpful, but essential.41 Because this element depends upon the identification
and comparison of specific criteria, the court may decide, as a matter of law,
whether the ideas contained in the two works are substantially similar.42 If the
court finds no similarity of ideas, the inquiry ends with a verdict for the
defendant.
The second portion, or "intrinsic test," evaluates whether, beyond the now
established similarity of ideas, there are similarities in the manner in which the two
works express those ideas.43 This intrinsic test relies upon the observations of the
"ordinary reasonable person," eschewing the analytic dissection and expert
testimony which characterized the extrinsic test.4" Determining the level of
similarity between the expressions contained in both works is delegated to the
trier of fact.'
36 Id
37 Id at 1163.
38 Id The Ninth Circuit noted that "the protection granted to a copyrighted work extends only
to the particular expression of the idea and never to the idea itself" (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201,217-18, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325, 333 (1954)).





4 r K., 562 F.2d at 1164; ire alsoTwentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579,
582, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392 (9th Cir. 1944) (stating that in the context of a motion picture and
screenplay, the at-issue works should be tested "by the observations and impressions of the average
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After its discussion of this bifurcated test, the Krnfft court compared its own
test to the model developed by the Arnstein court some thirty years earlier.47 The
court concluded that it had not modified Arntein, but simply made explicit
(through its idea/expression dichotomy) what Arnstein had only implied." The
"copying" test described in Arnmtein was the functional equivalent of the Kofft
court's statement that one must first establish whether or not a substantial
similarity exists between the ideas of two works.49 Likewise, the second portion
of the Kroffl test, dealing with expression, equates with Arnstein's holding that
infringement is an impmper copying of one's original work. Thus, unlawful
appropriation is legally synonymous with copying another's protected
expression.'
While both the Amstein and Krofft courts seem to share compatible philosophi-
cal ideas, there is one functional (and substantial) difference between the
approaches taken by each. The Arnstein test essentially measures substantial
similarity by reference to the quantity of probative, verifiable matches shared by
each of the two works; thus, the court arrives at the conclusion that access to a
plaintiff's work may be inferred where the amount of similarities "strike" the
court's judgment."s  Krofl, by contrast, makes little mention of access, and
overlooks entirely the Arnstein formulation of similarity by lesser or greater
degree; 2 indeed, the degree to which one piece of music must be similar to the
other is not commented upon by the court, leaving the reader to wonder at what
point the similarities become "striking" or even "substantial."
Ill. COMPARING FACTUAL FINDINGS REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL AND
STRIKING SIMILARrIY: WHEREJUDGES AND JURIES HAVE
DRAWN THE LINE
Before attempting to define the border between substantial and striking
similarity, some initial observations are in order. First, while a study of copyright
actions involving musical works contains its own unique terms (rhythm, harmony,
etc.), the ideas embodied in these terms can and often do roughly correspond to
similar ideas or terms in the other subject matter headings listed as
41 Id at 1164-65.
48 Id
41 Knmff, 562 F.2d at 1164.
so Id
"' Anutin, 154 F.2d at 468.
s2 Kjt, 562 F.2d at 1164-65.
[Vol. 37:113
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copyrightable. 3 It is in the practical application of these universal ideas that
difficulties specific to musical copyright litigation arise.
Further, copyright litigators should also be aware that the "idea / expression"
analysis found in Krofft TeL Pmd, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.' will influence litigation
strategies regarding infringement of copyrighted musical works. Musical "ideas"
(however ambiguously defined) are not protectable under copyright law;"5
practically, this further defines the substantial or striking similarity inquiry by
adding "uniqueness" as one of the criteria by which similarity is judged. For
example, in cases where judges are called upon to determine the similarities
between two pieces of popular music, many courts have taken judicial notice of
the "limited number of notes and chords available to composers and the resulting
fact that common themes frequently reappear in various compositions."56 In
other words, the ideas underlying both compositions are essentially the same and
may be common to a large number of pieces of music. Thus, the court is
compelled to analyze whether the allegedly infringing work has copied the unique
organization of these common (or, in some cases, trite) ideas.5 7 Simply
establishing that both works found their genesis in a common pool of ideas will
be insufficient where courts acknowledge that the spectrum of musical ideas is
relatively small.5"
Moreover, defendants have derived a number of litigation strategies from the
general judicial recognition that musical ideas, especially those recurrent in
popular music, are finite. For instance, it is not uncommon for a defendant to
claim that, while his work is obviously similar to the copyrighted work, both
works ultimately derive from a common source. Defendants predominately rely
upon two types of common sources.
s3 For instance, the elements of theme, structure, character, setting and phrasing, among others,
may apply to both musical and literary works. Compmanrep, 132 F.3d at 886-88, adth Toliver v. Sony
Music Entm't, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 909,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1502 (D. Alaska 2001).
54 562 F.2d 1157, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (9th Cir. 1977).
55 See Ma!Qw, 347 U.S. at 201 (noting that a copyright, unlike a patent, protects only the
expression of the idea, not the idea itsel).
-6 Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061,1068,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (2d Cir. 1988).
s7 Seejentral65McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 559 (discussing the protectable elements of a copyrighted
work).
sR Id at 566; see also Se/k, 741 F.2d 896 (discussing the burden of proving "striking similarity"
between two compositions). It is unclear whether this "uniqueness" criterion will be applied outside
the popular music context to genres where the musical forms are significantly more complex and the
availability of thematic, harmonic, and rhythmic material is not nearly so limited. Courts have implied
distinctions between the analysis necessary for popular music and that appropriate to more complex
musical forms. Id at 899 (noting with skepticism that a classical musicologist had never made a
comparative study of two popular musical works).
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First, the defendant may try to establish that his allegedly infringing work
actually derives from the defendant's own prior work. In Repp v. Webber,9 the
defendant disavowed any illicit copying, but also asserted that the composition at
issue was more similar to his own previously published work than to the plaintiffs
work.6'
Second, the defendant may also posit that his composition derives from other
public domain works rather than the plaintiff's work. Repp illustrates this strategy
perfectly: the defendant's expert alleged similarities between the infringing work
and public domain works from differing genres, including a Prelude from Johann
Sebastian Bach's Well-Tempered Clatier and an excerpt from Edvard Grieg's
Melodi.
Without enumerating the types of evidence a defendant would introduce in
this effort (which, while beyond the scope of this Note, will inevitably be similar
to the evidentiary issues discussed below), copyright litigators should beware the
quandary in which the plaintiff could find himself should this evidence prove
persuasive. At the very least, the defendant has cast a great deal of doubt upon
the basic assumptions made by the plaintiffs allegations; at worst, the defendant
has succeeded in making the trier of fact believe that it was actually the plaintiff
who did the copying."'
Finally, litigators should be keenly aware that, as in other litigation, many of
the copyright determinations will turn on the credibility of the expert witnesses
employed by the plaintiff. This dictum takes on special significance in the musical
context because, in the majority of the cases discussed in this Note, not only were
the expert witnesses professional musicians whose command of music theory and
composition was unparalleled, but also in most cases, some of the very best
musicologists and theorists that could be employed in venues such as this.3
Courts tend to afford greater deference to the empirical findings of an expert
whose curriculum vitae includes professorial appointments at universities which
traditionally symbolize a high level of musical scholarship (The Juilliard School,
" 858 F. Supp. 1292, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
60 Id at 1297-98.61 Id at 1298.
62 This type of evidence can be devastating to plaintiffs, but it also opens a window of
opportunity for the plaintiff to allege and prove that the defendant has a history of "borrowing"
from other musical sources. Any defense allegations that the defendant tends to be "influenced"
by other composers could substantiate that the defendant also borrowed in this case.
' For example, the cases discussed in this Note included an expert witness representing the
Northwestern University School of Music and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, Se/k, 741 F.2d at
899; the Chair of the Music and Performing Arts Department at New York University and a
Professor of Graduate Studies at the Juilliard School, Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 543; and the Chair of
the Musicology Department at the City University of New York, a prolific author who was widely
regarded as one of the world's most distinguished musicologists, Repp, 132 F.3d at 886.
[Vol. 37:113
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Indiana University, Eastman School of Music, etc.). These comments are
included simply to highlight the potential need for scholars of the very highest
musical order should the stakes in a copyright infringement case turn out to be
surprisingly high."
A. JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED CHARACAERISTICS OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS
Courts and commentators have disagreed over which particular characteristics
of musical compositions should form the basis for a comparison between a
copyrighted work and an allegedly infringing work. Although there is little
consensus with regard to specific details,6" courts generally categorize musical
technicalities into one of four groups: melody, harmony, rhythm and structure."
These classifications have been attacked by commentators,6 but remain the
standard categories into which musical similarities must fit."
Perhaps the most simple and straightforward of these categories is melody.
Almost everyone has a sense of what a melody is: the tune or theme around
which a piece of music is constructed. Deciphering melodic content can,
however, seem deceptively simple when, at times, the inquiry into whether the
"melodies" of two compositions are similar (in a justifiably legal sense) is every
bit as complex as the inquiries into the similarities of the other essential
components named above. One commentator has noted that many substantial
and striking similarity analyses turn on the overall comparisons between the
melodic structures of two works because of the relatively limited number of
" The witnesses called to present testimony regarding musicological and theoretical comparisons
are uniformly classically trained and educated. This remains true, even when the compositions being
compared are "pop" songs and the expert has little knowledge of the specific genre.
's This is undoubtedly due to the sophisticated nature of the musical composition process,
coupled with a general lack of musical training or understanding among jurists.
" See Tid, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (utilizing the four groups to show that two pieces of music were
not strikingly similar). For an informative article giving a general overview of the basic functions of
these categories and their relationship to each other, see Paul J. Heald, Rivhn te Rhetoric ofthe P b c
Interest Choir Diretors, Copy Machines, and New Arangeents of Prb&c Domain Mmw, 46 DUKE L.J. 241
(1996).
67 For some of the more critical reviews of the inadequacy of these categories, see Grinvalsky,
sxpra note 5 (discussing the difficulty a fact-finder has distinguishing between two similar pieces of
music); Aaron Keyt, Comment, An ImprowdFreworkforMair Plasiar Liiation, 76 CALL REV.
421 (1988) (arguing that existing criteria for distinguishing copyrighted musical material is
inadequate); Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Rak of the Expedi Witness in Muit Cop7ight Infingement
Cares, 57 FORDHAM L REv. 127 (1988) (examining expert witnesses' use of the four groups).
"This may be so because of judicial convenience or because no other appropriate mechanism
for debating the relative similarities of two musical compositions has developed. Seegeneraol Keyt,
sxpra note 67, at 429 (discussing the element of copying in a copyright suit); Grinvalsky, supra note
5, at 395 (noting the highly intangible quality of music).
9
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original choices a composer can make with regard to rhythm, harmony and
musical form.
69
A melody consists of a series of successive pitches which will recur throughout
the piece. Courts will focus on, among other things, the uniqueness of this
particular succession of notes, the shape and line of the musical phrase the notes
represent, when and how often they recur in each piece and whether or not one
melody evokes the same emotion or "mood" as the other."
Harmonic structure is the relationship of each pitch included in a composition
to the other pitch choices made by the composer. If successions of pitches can,
as noted above, be quite unique, the harmonic choices one can make after the
melodic content is set forth are, at least in theory, potentially boundless,7 1 and
have multiplied exponentially with the advent of the complex jazz and classical
formulas prevalent in the mid to late twentieth century. 72
Courts often speak of the number and frequency of common chord
progressions; 7 however, this simplistic approach has done little to focus copyright
litigators' attention on harmonic elements that may actually indicate probative
similarity. Likewise, simply comparing keys, modes and general harmonic style
(all of which are both common and unprotectable) can lead a court to mistakenly
conclude two pieces are dissimilar when, in fact, a closer inspection would have
revealed otherwise. 4  A court's willingness to consider the unique musical
69 See Keyt, ssfira note 67, at 431. The author generally agrees with Keyt's assertion that the
originality of melodic content is highly persuasive, especially when comparing two popular musical
expressions, but is skeptical of the application of this generalization outside the realm of pop music,
noting the proliferation of non-traditional rhythmic, harmonic and structural forms in both classical
and jazz music development in the twentieth century.
70 One must remember here that emotion, or "mood," as it is referred to by some courts, is not
a protectable expression under copyright law. However, where both works provoke the same
specific emotion, and that emotion is not so frequently represented in the literature as to be
considered trite, courts have indicated a willingness to consider this type of plaintiff's evidence,
subject to its connection with elements of the musical expression that are copyrightable. Se McR a,
968 F. Supp. at 567 (noting that a mood shared by many songs is unprotectable, but leaving open
the possibility that the uniqueness of moods, when combined with other protected elements, can
evidence similarity).
71 Here, again, one must note that harmonic choices are, by either historical design or aesthetic
concerns, more limited within the realm of the pop music genre. This has led at least one court to
conclude that evidence of striking similarity must comport with the court's strictest scrutiny. Id at
566 (asserting that courts have traditionally interpreted the standard of striking similarity "very
stringently').
72 Seetenf4 DONALDJ. GRouT& CLAUDE V. PALISCA, A HISTORY OF WESTERN Music 807-
80 (4th ed. 1988).
73 Se&, 741 F.2d at 904.
74 Litigators with musical backgrounds frequently are caught between two equally unproductive
strategies. Introducing evidence of comparative similarities that can be easily understood by judge
10
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"fingerprint" embodied in the modulations between keys and modes75 offers
more promise of the possibility of getting to the core of demonstrating true
harmonic similarity. Nonetheless, an ill-educated judiciary likely will base its
conclusions on the most easily demonstrable harmonic effects, despite the
potentiality that probative harmonic similirity may not be at all evident from this
type of analysis.
76
Courts also examine the "rhythm" of the two compositions. Rhythm is
loosely related to the spatial relationship between the pitch choices and is
generally accepted to include duration of both individual notes and larger musical
units such as phrases, themes or even entire compositions. Rhythm naturally
encompasses "meter," the number of musical pulses contained in each bar (or
subdivision) of a composition, but is more likely to be characterized in scholarly
circles as the "symmetry" linking the other artistic choices made by the composer.
Rhythm also covers the fluctuations in tempo (the speed at which the notes of a
composition are played) within a piece. However, again, educated musicians
regard tempo as merely a small portion of the overall symmetry of the composi-
tion, making judicial focus on whether one composition is played faster or slower
than another highly suspect and even irrelevant to the similarity inquiry.
Courts may be likely in this context to focus on the specific correlation
between the durations of notes in each composition.' Common meter, while not
a copyrightable element by itself, may be cited by the court if used in a "unique"
manner that establishes more than an intent to use something common to many
compositions. Another more insightful avenue of proving similarity involves
analysis of the symmetrical relationships between pitches and the placement of
certain musical events within the scope of the piece. Thus, the symmetry is
dissected on two levels: the interrelation of pitches within the smaller units
(measures, bars, or phrases), and the interrelation within the piece when viewed
as a whole.
This symmetrical view of entire compositions provides an appropriate bridge
to the final category under which comparison will be made: structure.7 Structure
and jury alike often leads the fact-finder to conclude that the similarities are based on musical ideas
that are not protectable. By contrast, introducing a more complex analysis of the harmonic structure
of the two works to a fact-finder that is largely ignorant of musical subtleties will likely engender
confusion and, consequently, a verdict for the defendant.
7s Tii, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
76 See Grinvalsky, mpra note 5, at 397 (offering insight into the typical judicial treatment of
harmonic similarities between musical compositions); Keyt, spra note 67, at 428.
7 McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 566 (stating that striking similarity is not established where certain
individual notes of each composition do not share "significant amounts of... rhythm").
71 Musical scholars generally deem commentary regarding the symmetrical boundaries of a
composition as also commenting upon the overall structure of a piece, such that the two elements
11
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is a catch-all phrase that sweeps in a number of dissimilar elements of musical
composition that do not fit neatly within any of the three previous classifications
but, nevertheless, can provide probative evidence of similarity and, thus, must be
considered. Certainly, structure includes any conscious effort on the part of the
composer to dictate a specific order for the composition. Examples of this type
of overarching structure range from the relationship between verses and chorus
in a rock ballad to the most complex variations on sonata form promulgated by
classical composers like Mozart and Beethoven.79
However, when a court speaks of structure, it may also be referring to
elements of musical composition that are only peripherally related to the
organization of the composition. For instance, the "style" of a composition may
be analyzed under this category, remembering that it is through the unique
application of these general elements that music becomes copyrightable in the
legal sense.' As a result of the significant overlap between rhythmic and
structural content, and because assertions of rhythmic or structural similarity tend
to function as supporting, rather than primary, allegations in music copyright
cases, they will be discussed together in this Note."1
The next focus of this Note will be to ascertain the particular methods in
which courts have applied these categories in the context of specific works.
Generally, however, other elements of music not capable of classification under
one of these broad categories may nevertheless be given significant weight if the
fact-finder believes that this element clearly points to an improper similarity
between two musical works. Where appropriate, this Note will reference these
non-traditional elements.
B. MELODY AND MELODIC CON'IENT
Melody, being the first and potentially most dispositive of the four elements
named above, 2 establishes the character of the composition. Courts may analyze
are significantly interrelated.
' See, e.g., Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Sonata in C Major, K 330 (1778), in W.A. MOZART:
SONATAS ANDFANTASIES FORTHEPIANO 138-51 (Nathan Broder ed.,Theodore Presser Co., 1960);
Ludwig van Beethoven, Sonata quasi una Fantasia, Op. 27, No. 2 ("Der Mondschein"), in LUDWIG
VAN BEETHOVEN: COMPLETE PIANO SONATAS, VOLUME 1, 248-61 (Heinrich Schenker ed., Dover
Publications, Inc., 1975).
80 Krff, 562 F.2d at 1165, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 103.
s' See r", note 78 and accompanying text.
52 See Keyt, supra note 67, at 431 ("It is in the melody of the composition---or the arrangement
of notes or tones that originality must be found. It is the arrangement or succession of musical
notes, which are the fingerprints of the composition, and establish its identity.") (quoting Northern
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the succession of notes in the melodic line, the relationship of those notes to each
other, and the intervals (musical distances) between each note, as well as survey
the numerical/empirical factors which characterize the melodic line (how many
notes are included in each theme; how many pitches in each are the "same"; at
what points in the melodic line do those similar pitches fall; do the pitches ascend
or descend, etc.). Again, some commentators feel that this essentially numerical
approach rarely provides any meaningful insight into the character and core of the
at-issue works. Nonetheless, these fundamental inquiries provide the basis for
most judges' first impression of the melodic content of the at-issue works.
Thus, a court's first question is usually a paraphrase of the following: How
many notes do the themes of the two works share?"3 Such a basic question often
leads courts to form influential first impressions either for or against substantial
copying, even though a finding of copying on this basis is replete with illogical
assumptions. However, it is quite obvious that two melodies can be aurally
identical and yet not share any common "notes." Thus, reliance on common
pitches is misleading at best.
Litigators and musical experts often try to solve this problem by either
transposing the infringing work into the same "key" as the copyrighted work, or
by transposing each to a neutral key. This certainly provides the most appropriate
basis for making a simple note for note, pitch for pitch comparison; however,
other unique elements that could be contributing to melodic similarity may be
sacrificed." A better solution to this dilemma (and one employed by some
musical experts in the cases mentioned in this Note) is to refrain from transposing
the compositions (thus preserving the inherent musical nuances that result from
the choice of a particular key)"5 and focus instead on the relational distances
between the pitches of each melody. These distances are referred to as "inter-
83 See, e.g., Allen v. Walt Disney Prods., 41 F. Supp. 134, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 365 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Gingg v. Twentieth Centufy-Fox Film Corp., 56 F. Supp. 701,62 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121 (S.D.
Cal. 1944); Repp, 858 F. Supp. at 1292, 1303.
" It is ironic, and somewhat mystifying, that most courts tacitly authorize this use of
transposition when analyzing the melodic content of a work (at least implicitly endorsing the notion
that key signature has little to do with probative similarity), and yet, may choose to credit a finding
against substantial or striking similarity in part to the fact that the two compositions were not written
in the same key. See Repp, 858 F. Supp. at 1303, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265 (holding no
substantial similarity exists where "the two pieces differ in ... key...").
'4 Though the contention is incapable of concrete proof, it is widely understood in
compositional circles that key signatures evoke certain "moods" or "emotions" in the listener. Thus,
Mozart regarded D Major to be the key of royalty and often set operatic arias written for characters
who were members of the nobility in this key. See "Hai gii vinta la causal... Vedr6 mentr'io
sospiro," is WOLFGANG AMADEUS MOZART, LE NOZZE D1 FIGARO, 291-300 (G. Schirmer, Inc.,
1951).
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vals." Courts can then ascertain the number of intervals in common," rather than
concentrating exclusively on common pitches.
This empirical approach is highly simplistic, and, at least at first glance,
understanding its ramifications for the bridge connecting substantial and striking
similarity is not difficult. Whether the court is analyzing melodic content under
the common pitch or common interval approach, the outcome is essentially the
same; similarity is determined based on quantity.87 The more intervals or pitches
the two melodies share, the greater the likelihood the court will find that similarity
exists."
However, there is an implication running throughout the copyright cases that
the thematic material of two musical works must be nearly identical in order to
sustain a claim of striking similarity. In Heim v. UniversalPictures Co.,"9 the Second
Circuit, when comparing the similarities between two compositions, concluded
that where there is little or no evidence of access to the plaintiff's work, "mere
similarity" would not be sufficient ° However, the court noted that a comparison
of the thematic material led it to conclude that the "identity is unmistakable."
91
Likewise, in Allen v. Walt Disny Prds.,92 the plaintiff alleged that the themes of his
protected composition and the allegedly infringing one were "identical with two
minor changes." '93 While ultimately concluding that threshold copying require-
ments had not been met, the court discussed the potential identity between the
thematic material of the two works, strongly suggesting that had the court
credited the plaintiff's expert witness, the allegation of melodic "identity" would
have been persuasive.
To this writer's knowledge, no courts have explicitly held that thematic identity
(or near identity) is an integral allegation in a striking similarity claim. Nonethe-
Admittedly, this approach still advocates similarity based on numerical comparisons alone,
completely overlooking quality-based melodic comparisons.
8 For an excellent example of the application of this analytic "rule" (and its ostensible
deficiencies), see McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 566. There, the court concluded that compositions were not
substantially similar where their melodic lines did not "share significant amounts of either pitch or
rhythm" and there were no places in both compositions that contained "three musical notes in a
row" that were identical. Id
" This can be more difficult for a court than it might appear because experts often disagree over
exactly how many notes or intervals two compositions "share." See Allen, 41 F. Supp. at 139-40
(plaintiff's expert proffered that the notes found in the two compositions were identical in twenty-
seven of the thirty measures analyzed, whereas defendant's expert opined that identity existed in only
four or five measures).
' 154 F.2d 480,68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (2d Cir. 1946).
90 Id at 487.
91 Ia
92 41 F. Supp. 134, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
9' Id at 137.
[Vol. 37:113
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less, courts looking to infer access from the striking similarities between two
compositions will be especially stringent in assessing the fact basis for such an
allegation.94 This raises the inference that the melodies must be almost identical
before the court will take such a claim seriously.9"
Within a melodic line, the location, or symmetrical position, of certain identical
or similar pitches/intervals will often be highly relevant to the copying inquiry.96
In Repp v. Webber," Andrew Lloyd Webber, of Broadway and concert fame,
counterclaimed that his work "Close Every Door" had been plagiarized by Ray
Repp, a liturgical musician in New York. In comparing Repp's "Till You" to
"Close Every Door," experts for both parties sought to illuminate the similar
symmetrical positions of pitches or intervals. The court noted in its findings of
fact that the melody of the first phrase of each song began with the "identical
interval of a sixth."99 Moreover, in deference to the expert for the defendant, the
court found that a three-note "oscillation" placed in the beginning phrase of each
song returned to its original note in "Till You" but not in "Close Every Door."'"
The placement of these notes and intervals within the melodic line influenced the
court's final decision.
Melodic symmetry likewise played an influential role in Selle v. Gibb.1°' There,
the court was asked to assess the similarity between "Let It End," written by
Chicago native Ronald Selle, and "How Deep Is Your Love," made popular by
the Bee Gees in the late 19 70s. The plaintiff's musical expert testified that the
thematic material of plaintiff's and defendant's compositions contained thirty-four
notes and forty notes, respectively. Of these, twenty-four were identical in both
pitch and symmetry. 2
Here, again, discerning the application of pitch or interval symmetry principles
to the debate over whether similarity rises to a level that is "striking" is not
9' See McRae, 968 F. Supp. 559.
9s See also Sele, 567 F. Supp. at 1178-79 (asserting that "near identity of two songs on a note-by-
note, measure-by-measure basis" demonstrates "striking similarities").
" In fact, some experts posit that comparisons of identical pitches or intervals are largely
irrelevant unless one also compares their symmetrical positions within the melodic line. While the
author is inclined to agree with this proposition, not all courts have adopted this more sophisticated
approach, opting instead for counting identical pitches separately from counting the number of
symmetrical positions occupied by these pitches. See Repp, 132 F.3d at 886 (plaintiff's expert
separated pitch identity and rhythmic symmetry).
97 947 F. Supp. at 112-14.
9s In the original action, Repp alleged that loyd Webber had copied one of his works, "Till
You,' in creating the melody for his song "The Phantom of the Opera" See 892 F. Supp. at 555-56.
" 947 F. Supp. at 112.
'o Id at 113.101 741 F.2d at 899-900.
102 Id
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difficult, at least in theory. Where one wishes to prove substantial similarity, one
must allege a general symmetrical alignment between several of the fundamental
pitches in a melodic line. If, however, evidence of access is lacking and one must
rely on comparison alone, the plaintiff's burden of proof becomes significantly
more exacting, with references made to nearly identical pitches or intervals in near
identical positions within the theme. Exactly what quantity of symmetrical
similarity a court will consider dispositive remains unclear."3
In most instances, a composition contains significant alterations to the
thematic material of its original statement, which occurs throughout its subse-
quent reappearances within the work. Even melodies created completely in a
vacuum can look and sound alike because of the limited number of notes and
sounds that are available to composers and pleasing to listeners."° Furthermore,
the generic nature of the note-for-note inquiry can lead to absurd findings
regarding similarity (or lack thereof) when one has a small quantity of notes or
symmetrical positions with which to work. In contrast, the manner in which a
composer chooses to treat his melody after its original statement is significantly
more indicative of both creativity and specificity. These treatments often generate
a greater quantity of musical text to analyze, i.e., more notes, more intervals, more
symmetrical positions. Thus, similarity of melodic detail and variation provides
a much more reasonable basis for a court's conclusions regarding musical
plagiarism.
The methods a composer may use to vary the style or character of a work are
quite literally boundless. Embellishments, ornaments, appoggiaturas, grace notes,
passing tones, improvised coloratura, and systematic variations all fall within this
category, as do a host of other compositional techniques."' 5 The technique a
103 It should be added here that many courts state that striking similarity can be shown on a
relatively small quantity of melodic intervals or pitches, assuming that the melody is so "idiosyn-
cratic" that the defendant's plagiarism of it is obvious. See, r.&, Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154
F.2d 480, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (2d Cir. 1946). Notwithstanding this example, the empirical
quantity of similarities remains a viable indicator of a court's willingness to infer access where there
is little hard evidence favoring the plaintiff's position.
'" The Second Circuit acknowledged this reality when it noted that few of the possible notational
permutations "suit the infantile demands of the popular ear." Thus, "[rlecurrence is not... an
inevitable badge of plagiarism." Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80,46 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
167,168 (2d Cir. 1940); seena/o Amstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275,28 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 426 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[llndependent reproduction of a copyrighted musical work is not
infringement, nothing short of plagiarism will serve.").
" Many of these techniques are widely used by composers of classical music, where it is not
uncommon to "borrow" material from a fellow composer. See Keyt, supra note 67, at 425-27
(discussing the informal rules for borrowing music developed by the artistic world).
[Vol 37:113
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss1/5
2002] TOWARD A DEFINITION OF STRIKING SIMILARITY 129
composer might choose is, of course, unprotectable;' ° however, the expression
devolving from the technique, with all of its twists and turns, is protected.
Logically, therefore, an analysis that fulfills the test for substantial similarity
may look only to the general thematic material without requiring identity in the
variations after the theme has been announced. A striking similarity inquiry, by
contrast, should focus on the similarity of details beyond the initial thematic
material. Litigators alleging striking similarity must be prepared to present
evidence at this intricate level of dissection.
In one case, Allen v. Walt Disny Productions,°7 the mere presence of melodic
embellishments influenced the litigation. There, the court heard evidence that the
Disney song "Some Day My Prince Will Come" was plagiarized from "Old Eli,"
a song found in a collection of college music published by Yale University." 8 The
thematic material contained in the two compositions, while generally similar, was
not an exact match; the allegedly infringing work contained "decorative and
embellishing notes." 9 The plaintiff sought to marginalize the importance of
these embellishments, claiming that they were "of no value and could be ignored"
in the court's similarity analysis. The defendant, by contrast, relied heavily upon
the inclusion of these notes to establish that his work was dissimilar"° The court,
in a particularly revelatory statement, concluded that, while both experts agreed
that there was some similarity between the melodies, there was "no identity" in
either the notes or the rhythm of the contested passages, apparently concurring
with the defendant's position that the presence of these decorative notes rendered
the compositions dissimilar.'
The expert witnesses testifying for both the plaintiff and defendant in Repp v.
Webbe 2 seem to contradict the Alen court's reasoning. There, both experts
focused on a comparison between what each labeled the "fundamental melodic
pitches." 3 In a footnote to its findings of fact, the court asserted that two
sixteenth notes lying between the fundamental melodic tones were "merely
ornamental and decorative, and discounting them in ascertaining the fundamental
melodic pitches is consistent with common musicological analytical practice."' 14
106 Knrf, 562 F.2d at 1165.
107 41 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
10 Id at 135.
109 Id at 139.
110 Id
Id
'" 947 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
"1 Id at 113.
114 Id at 112-13 n.2. The author is uncertain of the veracity of this statement in the context of
copyright infringement actions. See Alln, 41 F. Supp. at 139; see also Schultz v. Holmes, 264 F.2d
942, 943-45, 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 117,118-19 (9th Cir. 1959) (indicating that use of one differing
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In attempting to reconcileAllen and Repp, one could distinguish Repp by noting
that its findings of fact were gathered in the context of an explicit substantial
similarity inquiry (because the plaintiff did present evidence of defendant
access),"' whereas the Allen court was concerned with the depth of similarity
evidence because it deemed the plaintiff's evidence of access lacking." 6
Furthermore, each court may have simply followed the lead of its own expert
witnesses, with the experts proffering differing opinions as to the importance of
embellishment in the similarity inquiry. While an interpretative conflict on the
usefulness of evidence of melodic decoration may be lurking in the background
of copyright decisions, it is nevertheless safe to assume that this evidence will be
significantly more relevant in cases where striking similarity is alleged.
Common pitches, intervals, symmetrical positions, and alterations or
embellishments are the most frequently alleged musical elements to be put "at
issue" in a copyright infringement claim. Thus, most courts will base their
conclusions on comparisons of these elements, often without reference to less
obvious and more complex musical analyses. There are, however, some cases
which recognize the validity of alleging similarity based on these musical
complexities. Like those previously identified, the elements described below are
not protectable because they embody musical ideas. However, unlike those
discussed above, there is no empirical method to quantify the parameters of the
expression of these ideas, making it significantly more difficult for the court to
separate the idea from its expression. Nonetheless, a plaintiff supporting the
numerical findings made in the categories discussed above with a nuanced analysis
of the shape, progression, and character of the melodic line may help his cause."'
The concept of melodic phrasing could arise in copyright infringement cases.
A phrase has been defined as a musical sentence, something that has a beginning
and ending point and states one musical thought. Phrase marks (long, curved
lines printed over or under the thematic material) often help denote the
beginning, middle, and ending points of the thought. Phrases may consist of
whatever number of notes and rhythmic pulses the composer chooses. On this
basis, it is not difficult to see how the unique phrasing choices a composer makes
can be substantially copied."'
passing tone in a thematic bar comprised of six notes could substantiate dissimilarity).
115 Reif, 947 F. Supp. at 110-12.
116 A/len, 41 F. Supp. at 136-37.
317 By using the word "may" in this sentence, the author notes his caution regarding the potential
influence of this level of musical dissection. A general lack of understanding regarding these
elements coupled with their inherent ambiguity can lead courts either to dismiss them as
unprotectable ideas or ignore them altogether.
1 " The author has not encountered many cases in which the plaintiff alleged similarity of melodic
phrasing. For one unsuccessful attempt at doing so, see Alli, 41 F. Supp. at 138-40 (finding
[Vol. 37:113
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Melodic character may also influence a court's deliberations. The character of
a melody is determined by the mood or emotion it evokes in its listener. A
melody derives its character from the manner in which it is stated and the specific
notational directions for reproducing it. For instance, melodies can be notated
in sweeping, lyrical lines, suggesting a romantic or grandiose mood, in short
phrases with directions that certain notes be played in a detached manner,
indicating a martial or solemn feel.'
Notational devices, such as accent marks and dynamic indications,"2° define a
theme's character and are quite easily copied.'2 For instance, where a composer
employs an unusual gradation of dynamic marking that is not widely disseminated
in the musical literature, showing that the particular mark or set of marks is
present in the infringing work might be of some probative value to the plaintiffs
case." In another instance, a composer might indicate a specific pattern of
accent markings on beats that remain traditionally unaccented or dynamic
markings that oscillate between very loud and very soft in rapid succession.
Copying the exact pattern of either of these expressions is probably not
permissible, even in a jurisdiction that stringently applies idea/expression
analysis.22
Alleging that the infringing work's melodic emotion or mood is generally
similar to the mood your own work evokes is probably a counter-productive
strategy. Courts quite simply have a difficult time separating the idea (the
emotion or mood) from the particular expression of that idea.2 4 Plaintiffs may
also allege that the two compositions in question share melodic content similar
in tessitura"'' or are written in the same octave. Certainly, copying the tessitura
similarities, but not to the level of plagiarism).
"' The key or mode in which a melody is written will influence the type of emotion evoked.
Keys and modes are introduced in detail in the next section of this Note; however, this discussion
highlights the level of interrelation between these broad musical categories.
' Dynamic marks tell the musician the volume level at which to execute a phrase or note.
121 Se Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718,189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 406 (9th
Cir. 1976) (defendants acknowledged the similarity of the "first four notes" of two compositions,
but noted the melody of its composition was rhythmically "smooth" when compared to the
"martial... angular" style of the plaintiff's melody).
122 S SERGEI R .CHMANINOFF, PRELUDE IN C# MINOR, Op. 3,No. 2,5-6 (Boosey and Hawkes,
Inc. 1947) (exhibiting unusual dynamic marking usage occurs in Rachmaninov's Prelude in C#
minor, Op. 3, No. 2, where, in the latter passages of the work, the composer indicates a volume level
offplus sforzando markings (# and accent markings on each chord).
12" Classical composers in the twentieth century were particularly prodigious in their use of "non-
traditional" melodic markings. See, e.,g., SERGEI PROKOFIEV, CONCERTO No. 3 IN C MAJOR FOR
PIANO AND ORCHEmRA, Opus 26, 45-46 (International Music Co. 1956).
124 See, e.g., McR a, 968 F. Supp. at 566-67 (holding that general theme and mood of first person
love song not protectable because it is shared by many other songs).
t2" Tessitura refers to pitch location (how high or low the pitches are) along the spectrum of
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in which a theme is set can be grounds for suspicion, provided that the tessitura
chosen has some unique feature. However, courts may be skeptical of this
analysis because of the limited number of octaves from which a composer may
choose. 26
To summarize, plaintiffs are likely to make at least four separate allegations
regarding the melodic content of the two compositions being compared:
similarity of pitches, similarity of melodic intervals, similarity of pitches and
intervals in symmetrical positions, and similarity between the melodic embellish-
ments of the two works. In addition, plaintiff litigators may want to consider the
viability of presenting evidence that the thematic material of each shares melodic
phrasing, character, mood, and tessitura. The implications for both substantial
and striking similarity are generally clear (though the delineations are not
extraordinarily helpful): the less influential one's evidence of access, the more
likely one will be called upon to produce a highly specific analysis of the probative
similarities between, not only the general thematic material of the two works, but
also the detailed melodic calculations each composer has incorporated.
C. HARMONY AND HARMONIC CONMENT
Harmony has been loosely defined by a musical expert in one copyright
infringement action as "the essence of how one chord (consisting of three or
more notes sounded simultaneously) relates to the next, and how the chords
progress from the first chord in a phrase of music to the last."' 7 Translated, this
divides harmonic structure into several components.
Melodies are "accompanied" by chords and chord progressions. These chords
give the melodic content a particular shape, depth, and texture, as well as
influence the general character of the work." Harmonic indications determine
the key in which the piece is written and whether the piece is written in a major
or minor mode.29 Harmonic sophistication is an indicator of originality; its
available sounds.
126 There are only seven octaves on the piano; other instruments or voice types are significantly
more limited.
'1' Repp, 858 F. Supp. at 1298 n.7 (quoting Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, professor of music at New
York University).
'" As noted above, melodies can have a unique character; however, the harmonic structure
determines the character of the composition as a whole (although it can also influence a listener's
perception of thematic material).
'2 See Rpp, 947 F. Supp. at 113 (supporting the notion that the simplest way to understand the
concept of mode--as that term is most often used in copyright actions-is to connect major modes
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duplication in an allegedly infringing work will be subject to heightened judicial
suspicion.'3
As with allegations of melodic similarity, most musical experts begin an
analysis of the harmonic parallels between two works with non-specific allegations
of a general nature, gradually refining the examination until reaching a highly
focused level of harmonic specificity. The first, and most general, allegation
proffered by musical experts is a familiar one: a large number of similar chords
are present in both pieces.' 31 Of course, chords are not protectable; thus, the
plaintiff must prove that a large number of chords have been lifted, either in their
entirety or with only minor changes. Courts here have indicated a willingness to
follow the quantitative approach described above. Thus, similarity will be judged
by the number of similar chords found in both works.
In assessing striking similarity, the number of common chords must inevitably
be greater (absent the unlikely event that the copyrighted work presents some
note combination that literally no one else has ever used and the defendant copied
that exact combination). The court may also look for evidence that the chords
are structured in precisely the same fashion.
For instance, chords that are combinations of three notes can be presented in
root position or in one of two inversions. In root position, the chord is stacked
in intervals of a third (the interval between both the bottom note and the middle
note and the middle note and the top note is a third). A first inversion chord
occurs when one takes the bottom note of a root position chord and displaces it
by an octave so that it is now the highest note in the chord. Second inversions
are constructed similarly by taking the first inversion chord and displacing the
bottom note by an octave so that the note that was on bottom is now on top.
Inverting chords is probably the most common harmonic technique; all
musical genres are replete with examples of chord inversions. Whether a
particular chord that is common to both compositions is notated in the same
inversion in both may be highly relevant to the similarity inquiry. A court that
would probably uphold a finding of substantial similarity would likely do so on
the basis of identity between chords, even where the chords appear in different
inversions. However, a difference in inversion may well affect the court's
assessment of similarity if the plaintiff is claiming that the similarities should
"strike" the court's .eye and ear. 3 2
130 Id
131 Id at 112; Tir, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (noting the use of chords with "certain common
characteristics").
3 See generaI# Ti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 543-44 (giving an exceptionally thorough analysis of the
similarities and differences in the chord structures of the at-issue works).
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Quite often, plaintiffs will assert that, not only the individual chords, but also
the chord progressions contained in certain passages of both works are similar. 3 '
The plaintiff must allege more than a mere similarity between chord progressions,
for many courts have held that chord progressions of the type mentioned here are
simply too trite to be protectable." Thus, to withstand the strict scrutiny of a
striking similarity inquiry, not only should the progressions be nearly identical in
both works, but the progressions must also have something unique within their
structure that captures the court's attention.
One example of the chord progression uniqueness needed to justify a
conclusion that two compositions are strikingly similar is found in Gaste v.
Kaiserman." There, the plaintiff, an "obscure" French composer, claimed that
one of his songs had been impermissibly used as a model for the song "Feelings,"
written and recorded by international singing star Morris Albert."3 6 A jury found
for the plaintiff, holding that the songs were so strikingly similar that defendant's
access to the material should be inferred." 7 The Second Circuit affirmed the
jury's findings, holding that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to infer
access based on striking similarity.' 38
The Second Circuit was particularly impressed by the plaintiff's evidence of
what it termed a "unique musical 'fingerprint.' ",139 The musical device used in
both compositions was a unique chord progression (in the expert's terms, an
"evaded resolution") which modulated from one key to another."4 The court
noted that the harmony progressed from the penultimate chord into a new key
in a very original and creative fashion, causing the plaintiff's expert to posit that
"he had never seen this particular method of modulation in any other composi-
tions."'' The expert used a very effective analytic tool in justifying his conclu-
sions: he first noted the "normal" manner in which a progression would resolve
into a new key, and then proceeded to show how this particular manner of
resolution was genuinely creative."'
133 Chord progressions are the connections from one chord to the next, with an eye toward the
cadence (or end) of the progression and how the harmony changes along the path.
" See, e.g., Tiw, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 543-44 (noting harmonic progression used in both
compositions so common as to be "found in songs in all genres"); McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 566
(stating that chord progressions found in both compositions "are the most common chord
progressions in all of the music of Western civilization').
131 863 F.2d 1061, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (2d Cir. 1988).
136 Iu
1 Id at 1063.
138 Id at 1068.
139 id
'40 Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1068.
141 Id
142 Id at 1068. It should be noted here that, while the plaintiff's expert opined that every measure
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The Gaste decision provides a close look at one specific type of harmonic
evidence a court has found persuasive in the striking similarity context.
Conversely, several decisions provide the basis for rejecting as unproductive other
types of evidentiary allegations. The foremost of these is an allegation that both
pieces were written in the same key or contain the same key signature. Courts
almost uniformly reject this type of evidence for two reasons. First, setting a
work in a particular key is conceptually difficult to classify as expression."
Second, even if a judge believes that key choice can evidence some creativity, the
musical idea giving rise to the choice is virtually inseparable from the expression.
Key choice can, however, sustain or defeat substantial similarity (and possibly
even striking similarity) when a work at issue contains instruments or voice types
performing in differing keys simultaneously. For instance, inAcuff-Rose Msic, Inc.
v. Campbell,'" the defendants, the rap group 2 Live Crew, were accused of
misappropriating sections of Roy Orbison's hit song "Oh, Pretty Woman." The
district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants
ultimately turned on the qualification of the 2 Live Crew version of "Pretty
Woman" as a parody within the meaning of the fair use doctrine;4 ' however,
before applying the fair use factors, the court heard testimony regarding whether
the two versions were similar.146
In its evidentiary findings, the court noted the occurrence of key simultaneity
in the 2 Live Crew version.4 7 An expert for the defendants testified that, while
the chorus of the song was written and performed in A Major, the lead vocalists
were singing (rapping) in B Major, giving the entire song a "comic" aspect.14 In
the court's opinion, this modification established a significant dissimilarity
between the two versions. 49
of the infringing work "cannot be traced back to something which occurs in" the infringing work,
the Second Circuit essentially based its holding on this singular (though admittedly powerful)
evidentiary finding. See rnpra note 103 and accompanying text.
14 See spra note 85. This contention is actually less certain than it might first appear. There are
artistic considerations underlying the choice of key signature, as indicated above.
' Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (M.D.
Tenn. 1991), ovemded on othergrotnds by Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817 (6th Cir. 1992).145 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
"4 Aaeff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1156; see ako Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d at 1433.
147 Id
148 Id
149 It is not unheard of for Twentieth Century classical composers to employ different key
signatures simultaneously within the same piece. For instance, Prokofiev once wrote a piano piece
in which the left hand played in one key and the right hand in another. Se "Allegro precipitato"
from Sarcasms, Op. 17, in SERGEI PROKOFIEV, SELECTED WORKS, VOLUME II, 12-15 (Pavel
Lukyanchenko ed., Kalmus Publishers, 2000). This type of harmonic variance is certainly unique;
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Any potential similarity between the "mode" in which the two pieces are set
can be valuable to a plaintiff, but only as a supporting, and not a primary,
allegation. The truth of this statement lies in the fact that, when courts are
addressing modes, they most frequently mean that the key in which a piece is set
is either major or minor,' and since there are only two of these "modes" upon
which to rely, the court will likely deem it little more than coincidence that two
compositions share the same mode. However, where the more creative harmonic
devices employed in a work are alleged to have been copied, the fact that the




To this point, our discussion of harmonic similarity has focused on those
elements which could be labeled rudimentary, or common to every musical work.
duplication of chords, chord progressions, key signature, and mode. Courts have,
in the harmonic context, employed one level of analysis that is more subtle. In
assessing the similarities between "Till You" and "Close Every Door," the District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered the overall quality of the
harmonic content contained in each song. s2 The court found a high level of
compositional sophistication in "Close Every Door," with Webber having used
complex harmonic devices. ' This level of harmonic sophistication made the
simplistic compositional techniques used in 'Till You" creatively distinguishable,
and the overall character of the pieces dissimilar."s Note that this approach
focuses not on the specific harmonic choices made by the composer but on the
artistic level at which those choices are capable of being made.'55
D. RHYTHMIC AND STRUCTURAL CONTENT
When deciding whether a protected composition has been copied, courts tend
to place primary emphasis on the similarities of melodic and harmonic content
it seems likely, however, that, under the stringent application of a striking similarity test, the plaintiff
would be required to demonstrate that the defendant had copied not only the uniqueness of the idea,
but also the specificity of the expression.
ISO There are, of course, other musical definitions for the term "mode" which could bear on the
question of similarity. Because the term mode has not been defined to include any of the other
potential musical meanings in any cases known to this author, these potential meanings and their
implications for a similarity inquiry are not discussed.
151 See Ti"/, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 543-44; tpp, 947 F. Supp. at 113 (illustrating cases where similarity
of mode influenced the court's decision).
152 Ropp, 947 F. Supp. at 113.
153 Id
154 Id
' See also Tim, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (noting that the harmony of defendant's composition is
"more complex, nuanced, and dissonant" than that included in the plaintiffs composition).
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shared by the two works. Because of that tendency, there is less judicial
commentary on either the rhythmic or structural similarity between compositions.
Nevertheless, similarities in these two general categories will receive some judicial
attention and can bolster a plaintiff's claims.
Rhythm, as defined in the case law, "is determined by the time value of notes
and silences." ' 6 The important components of rhythm are tempo, note value and
silence, and symmetry. One assesses rhythmic similarity by comparing these
elements.
157
First, a plaintiff will likely allege that the note values' 58 prevalent in his
copyrighted composition are also present in the defendant's work.' s9 Courts tend
to find this argument lacking in force unless the allegation also includes evidence
that the common note values are placed in identical symmetrical positions.
Melodic symmetry has been discussed in great detail above; suffice it to say that
all of the arguments regarding melodic symmetry apply with equal magnitude
when one is discussing rhythmic symmetry. The range of common note values
is quite limited (whole notes, half notes, quarter notes, eighth notes, etc.); on that
basis, the court will probably be unsympathetic to allegations that note values
themselves have been copied.IW'
However, evidence that rhythmic values have been copied in exact symmetri-
cal positions is much more powerful. For instance, the Repp court credited expert
testimony noting not only an identity between the note values presented in the
opening passages of both works, but also the identity of the placement of these
note values (most notably, the first three pitches of both songs).' 6' Because of its
potential lack of originality, this evidence will not be particularly strong under the
scrutiny of a striking similarity inquiry unless the duplication of exact note values
is voluminous. 62
Time signature is extremely generic and leaves little room for artistic choices
by the composer. Although copyright actions contain general allegations of time
signature duplication,63 courts usually do not emphasize their potential
5 Repp v. Webber, 858 F. Supp. at 1297 n.7 (quoting Dr. Lawrence Ferrara).
"57 See CHRISTINE AMMER, THE HARPER DICTIONARY OF Music 357 (2d ed. 1987) (breaking
rhythm into pattern, beat and speed).
's8 Id at 164. The term "note value" refers to the length of time each note is sustained.
159 E.g., Ropp, 947 F. Supp. at 105; McRar, 968 F. Supp. at 559.
"SO This is true unless the note value itself represents some creative energy on the composer's
part, such as when a composer writes using beat divisions uncommon to a particular genre (as in
frequent use of 128th notes).
16 Rjp, 947 F. Supp. at 105.
162 See Allen v. Walt Disney Productions, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.N.Y. 1941)
("[Slirilarities... must do more than engender a suspicion of piracy; they must establish piracy with
reasonable certainty.").
163 E.g., Repp, 947 F. Supp. at 105; Allen, 41 F. Supp. at 137.
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influence.'" Nonetheless, striking similarity could be demonstrated where a time
signature was highly unusual and exactly duplicated.6
Tempo refers to the speed at which a composition is performed, including any
variances on the tempo contained in the work. Courts have disagreed regarding
the meaning and parameters of the term "tempo" in musical infringement cases.
In some cases, tempo is defined by the overall structure or style of the work. For
instance, in McRae, the tempos of the two at-issue works were defined by their
overall structure and style (what the court called a country "two-step"').16 By
contrast, most musical experts believe that the actual tempo of a work is denoted
by the composer at the beginning of the piece."
7
Regardless of how the court defines tempo, its commentary on the subject is
likely to be scarce. The expression of a tempo is even more difficult than time
signature to separate from its constituent ideas. Striking similarity probably could
only be demonstrated where the tempo marking was either sufficiently exagger-
ated or its phrasing was highly unique.'" Note again that the presence of a
striking similarity between the rhythmic components of two works turns on the
level of creativity exhibited in the copyrighted work and the quantity of identity
that can be proven in the infringing work.
The structure of a composition can vary in an infinite number of ways, a large
number of which have been utilized by composers in the development of Western
music. Certain classical and popular forms have been repeatedly explored by
composers throughout the past five centuries."W Thus, the format of the
copyrighted work must be highly creative and that creativity must be sufficiently
plagiarized by the defendant before the similarities will rise to the level of legally
striking.
164 Aln, 41 F. Supp. at 137-38.
"6 AMMER, .vra note 157, at 442. "Normal" time signatures include 2/4,3/4,4/4 (also known
as common time), 6/8, and 9/8. If one were to compose in an extremely "abnormal" time signature
such as 122/8 or 76/4, and that signature were exactly duplicated, this would be helpful in
establishing striking similarity.
968 F. Supp. at 566-67.
167 Examples of tempo markings commonly used in classical musical compositions include
allegro, adagio, moderato, and presto.
16 For instance, the Twentieth Century composer Vincent Persichetti is known for his unique
tempo markings. See "Fourth Piano Sonata, Op. 36," in VINCE.NT PERSICHETITI, PIANO SONATAS
(COMPLETE), 63-98 (Elkan-Vogel, Inc., 1988). The sonata includes one movement whose tempo
is marked "Intimately," idi at 65, and another marked "Plaintively" id at 85.
" Classical sonata form fits into this category, and was employed by Haydn, Mozart, and
Beethoven, among others. In popular music, one court notes the recurrence of the verse-chorus-
verse-chorus form. See McRae, 968 F. Supp. at 567 (noting that verse-chorus-verse-chorus is "one
of the most common in country music").
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As in both melodic and harmonic comparisons, courts will probably begin a
structural comparison of two works by measuring the empirical boundaries of
each. For instance, the McRae court noted how many chord changes were
contained in each of the at-issue works.17° Similarly, the Repp court began its
discussion of structural similarity by stating the number of measures contained in
each work, the number of measures contained in the themes of each work, and
the percentage of the overall composition that was represented by each theme."17
While this type of comparison is almost identical to those enumerated in previous
sections of this Note, what is not identical is its persuasive value. Where
numerical comparisons of melodic, harmonic, and even rhythmic content are
quite important in the court's formation of an impression on similarity, specific
numerical comparisons of the length of pieces or themes are given less weight by
courts.
17 2
Repetition is one of the essential components of form. How themes,
harmonies, and rhythms are repeated throughout the entirety of a piece is a
subject of great interest in the similarity inquiry. For instance, in Allen, the
plaintiffs alleged that their composition and the defendant's composition shared
not only the same musical pattern (an extremely common form), but also the
exact placement of the thematic material within that pattern. 173 Likewise, in Repp,
thematic placement played a prominent role, as the musical experts divided the
pieces into two large sections and compared each for the location of melodic
content.' 74 Note that this adds a significant new layer to the striking similarity
claims: plaintiffs might be required to prove that the thematic material is the
same, that it is repeated in an identical symmetrical pattern, that it is harmonized
in a near identical fashion, and that the theme recurs in a similar position in the
formats of both songs.
Of course, not all musical forms are commonly used, and proving that a
defendant copied an unusual pattern could be highly influential in the striking
similarity inquiry. Very few cases have considered this question; thus, there is no
real possibility for commentary on the level at which a form must be original for
its copying to qualify as striking. 7 1 The complexity of a particular form could play
70 968 F. Supp. at 566.
'71 947 F. Supp. at 112.
17 For instance, in Repp, the fact that "Close Every Door" was comprised of 108 measures
whereas "Till You" contained only 78 measures had no effect on the court's decision. Id at 112,
115-16.
'73 41 F. Supp. at 137.
'"' 947 F. Supp. 112-13.
17s See, e.g., Tin, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (noting that any structural similarities between two songs
are unprotectable because they are "uniformly shared with most modern popular rock music").
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a significant role in determining this question as well; again, however, there is little
judicial commentary available on the subject.
To summarize, both rhythmic and structural comparisons have their own
unique places within a similarity inquiry, and each can aid a plaintiff whose case
is already strong. However, each occupies a smaller portion of the court's time
because of the greater possibility that the composer's true artistic choices will have
been made at either the melodic or harmonic level. Where rhythmic or structural
similarity is alleged, the harsh nature of the striking similarity inquiry requires that
the copyrighted work contain a high level of creativity and the infringing work a
high level of identity among the allegedly copied passages.
IV. CONCLUSION
To most courts, the differences between substantial and striking similarity
involve threshold questions of verifiable quantity- what quantity of pitches,
rhythms, and/or harmonic devices are comparable, i.e., how much of the piece
may be appropriately compared. Obviously, the easiest distinction between
striking and substantial similarity involves this assessment: the greater the
quantity of proper comparisons, the more likely a court will position itself to find
two compositions strikingly similar.
There are two more concepts that generally enter into the court's similarity
probe. The first centers around originality: how creative is the copyrighted work?
If it is not highly unique under one or more of the enumerated categorical
analyses, the chances of finding even substantial similarity between the two works
are small (although, admittedly, the originality threshold for substantial similarity
is lower). Second, there is the question of how much actual identity is found in
the infringing work. The threshold for identity between the passages of the two
works has been left unsettled; of course, a court is more likely to require identity
in the striking similarity context, but that statement is obvious and not very
helpful. Close identity between two works can be lacking and yet a court could
still find substantial similarity; however, it is doubtful that a court would find two
works strikingly similar if they do not share passages that are not only common,
but also nearly identical.
Thus, one formulation for striking similarity could read something like this:
quantity + creativity + identity = striking similarity. Quantity is the threshold
issue; without a substantial quantity of common passages, the court will not look
further. If the quantity prong is met, the court will consider the uniqueness of the
work, with an eye toward the copyrighted composition's unusually creative
portions. Assuming that such originality exists, the court will then consider
whether the unique portions have been duplicated in their entirety or simply
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modeled. The more identity can be proven, the greater the likelihood that striking
similarity will be found.
JOHN K. AUrRY
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